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AIRLINE SECURITY AND EMPLOYEE IMMUNITY:
THE SECOND CIRCUIT PROMOTES AIRLINE
SECURITY INTERESTS AT ALL COSTS—EVEN
IF IT MEANS THROWING EFFICIENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY BY THE WAYSIDE
LANDON M. HANKINS*
I. INTRODUCTION
WHEN ROSALINDA BAEZ arrived at John F. Kennedy Inter-national Airport to catch her flight to Austin, Texas, she
likely had no idea that she was about to utter a phrase that
would cause her to lose her job, gain media attention, and em-
bark on a journey to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.1 But sometimes life takes an unexpected turn. Upon dis-
covering that she had been waiting for her JetBlue Airways (Jet-
Blue) flight in the wrong terminal, Baez arrived at the correct
gate only to find that the passengers had already boarded.2 She
was told by JetBlue agent Tiffany Malabet that Baez had arrived
too late and would have to catch a later flight.3 Baez then made
a statement in which she mentioned a bomb in connection with
her luggage that was on the plane.4 Malabet subsequently re-
layed the exchange to her supervisor, who in turn informed the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA).5 Security offi-
cials rerouted the plane, yet failed to find a bomb on board.6
After an investigation, Baez was ultimately ordered to pay Jet-
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2017; B.A. Howard Payne
University, summa cum laude, 2013. Landon would like to thank his family and
friends for their undying love and support and would like to dedicate this
publication to the memory of his dear friend Kelley Raye.
1 See Baez v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 793 F.3d 269, 274 (2d Cir. 2015) (Baez II).
2 Baez v. JetBlue Airways, 745 F. Supp. 2d 214, 218–19 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (Baez I).
3 Id.
4 Baez II, 793 F.3d at 272.
5 Id. at 272–73.
6 Id. at 273.
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Blue restitution for the rerouting of the plane and sentenced to
three years probation for marijuana found in her suitcase.7
Baez subsequently filed suit against both JetBlue and Malabet,
alleging negligence, defamation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.8 The district court granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment, finding that both JetBlue and
Malabet were immune from liability under the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA).9 Baez appealed, arguing
(1) that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether Malabet’s statement relaying what Baez had said was
materially false; and (2) that Malabet’s statement was outside
the scope of the ATSA because Malabet’s supervisor did not fall
into any of the categories of individuals enumerated by the stat-
ute.10 The court rejected Baez’s arguments, holding that no rea-
sonable jury could have concluded that Malabet’s statement was
materially false and that the statement was fully covered by the
ATSA.11
This casenote will focus on the first issue only and argue the
safeguards that the court’s opinion provides to airline employ-
ees purport to enhance safety but instead advance a policy para-
digm that promotes inefficiency and fails to recognize the
importance of relaying full and accurate information when re-
porting security-related incidents.
II. THE COURT FOUND THAT MALABET’S ALLEGED
STATEMENT WAS NOT MATERIALLY FALSE
This case centers on Baez’s allegation that Malabet misrepre-
sented their verbal exchange in the report to her supervisor.
Baez admits that she said, “[i]sn’t it a security risk to let a bag go
on a plane without a passenger, what if there was a bomb in the
bag?” and that when Malabet told her that the TSA would have
caught it, Baez replied, “TSA—my ass” and walked away.12 Baez
alleged, however, that Malabet misrepresented the conversation
when relaying it to her supervisor, reporting that Baez had af-
firmatively stated that she had a bomb in her bag.13 Malabet, on
the other hand, contended that she reported that Baez had
7 Id.
8 Id.
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posed the hypothetical question, “what if there was a bomb in
my bag?”14 According to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) complaint, Baez both posed the hypothetical ques-
tion and affirmatively stated that there was a bomb in her bag.15
When the U.S. Congress created the TSA to “assess and man-
age threats against air travel,” it strove to ensure that airlines
and their employees would have no incentive to withhold their
suspicions from the TSA, and so it granted airlines and their
employees immunity from civil suits arising from such commu-
nications.16 Thus, the ATSA provides that
[a]ny air carrier or . . . employee of an air carrier . . . who makes
a voluntary disclosure of any suspicious transaction relevant to a
possible . . . threat to aircraft or passenger safety, or terrorism . . .
to any employee or agent of the Department of Transportation,
the Department of Justice, any Federal, State, or local law en-
forcement officer, or any airport or airline security officer shall
not be civilly liable to any person under [either federal or state
law].17
Congress excepted from this protection statements made with
“actual knowledge that the disclosure was false, inaccurate, or
misleading” or “reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of
that disclosure.”18 To recover under this provision, a claimant
must show that the statement was “materially false,” defined as a
statement that “would have a different effect on the mind of the
. . . listener from that which the truth would have produced.”19
The court based its holding that no reasonable jury could find
Malabet’s statement materially false on its conclusion that a rea-
sonable security officer would have investigated Baez’s hypothet-
ical remark even if Malabet had relayed it exactly as Baez alleged
she stated it.20 The court gave several reasons for its conclusion.
First, the fact that the plane left with Baez’s unaccompanied lug-
gage was enough to cause a reasonable security officer to want
to investigate the matter.21 Second, airline employees should
not be held liable for not relaying a person’s statement with per-
fect accuracy because holding them liable in such instances
14 Id. at 272–73.
15 Id. at 273.
16 Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852, 857–58 (2014).
17 49 U.S.C. § 44941(a) (2012).
18 Id. § 44941(b).
19 Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 863 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
20 Baez II, 793 F.3d at 275–76.
21 Id. at 275.
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could potentially deter employees from reporting suspicious re-
marks, which could cause an airline to be subject to civil penal-
ties for failing to report potential threats.22 Third, that the FBI
included in its report Baez’s hypothetical remark further evi-
dences that a reasonable security officer would have investigated
the matter based on the hypothetical remark alone.23 Fourth,
the standard is an objective one; the court categorically stated
that “[a]ny reasonable security officer would follow up on a re-
port of a disgruntled passenger who adverted to a bomb in lug-
gage and deprecated the agency responsible for detecting such
bombs.”24 Finally, the court asserted that the TSA’s policy of
‘“when in doubt, report’ would be defeated if air carriers and
their employees were exposed to liability for reporting a state-
ment that references a bomb in luggage.”25
III. THE COURT’S OPINION IS A WIN FOR AIRLINE
EMPLOYEES AND SECURITY
The court’s holding and reasoning undoubtedly favor the in-
terest of public security in air travel and will surely be viewed
favorably by those who support granting a great amount of def-
erence to allow airline employees to report suspicious behavior.
The opinion’s sweeping language assures airlines and their em-
ployees that, when dealing with matters of security, they need
not fear liability for failing to relay a suspicious person’s state-
ment with precise accuracy.26 Indeed, the court implicitly en-
couraged airline employees to liberally report any utterance or
suggestion that could be reasonably construed to refer to terror-
istic violence, including “bare reference[s]” to bombs, ambigu-
ous statements, and even jokes.27 Security officers also receive
implicit encouragement regarding their job responsibilities via
the court’s broad language regarding the “reasonable officer”—
language that implies that officers should investigate all state-
ments made by passengers that reference bombs in luggage28
22 Id.
23 Id. at 276.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 See id. at 275 (asserting that an employee need not relay the “precise word-
ing” of a potential security threat (quoting Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134
S. Ct. 852, 865 (2014))).
27 See id. at 275–76.
28 See id. at 276 (“Any reasonable security officer would follow up on a report of
a disgruntled passenger who adverted to a bomb in luggage and deprecated the
agency responsible for detecting such bombs.”).
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and even seems to suggest that officers should investigate every
instance in which a bag happens to be on a plane without its
owner.29
Policy factors are featured prominently in the opinion.30 The
judgment arguably serves to advance the policy interests of pro-
tecting employees acting in accordance with their duty to report
threats to civil aviation,31 both encouraging airline employees
and security officers to report and investigate liberally and deter-
ring civil lawsuits against airline employees who report question-
able statements. One could reasonably infer that this court
simply does not believe that people should be able to file a law-
suit as a response to unfortunate consequences arising from
their ill-thought decision to utter the word “bomb” in an air-
port.32 It is clear that this circuit court panel is ready and willing,
in the interest of security and prevention, to protect any em-
ployee from any legal reprisal arising from his or her decision to
relay such information to either a supervisor or security
personnel.
IV. THE OPINION MISAPPLIED THE LAW AND
UNWISELY DISREGARDED EFFICIENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
Notwithstanding the court’s safeguarding of security interests,
any praise that the court might appear to deserve is clearly out-
weighed by the errors the court committed. The court’s opinion
is contaminated with non-linear reasoning, misapplication of
the law to the facts, and language that potentially threatens the
efficiency of airline travel. While the court at the outset accu-
rately stated the legal framework governing the case—that Baez
must show a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
29 See id. at 275 (“[S]ince Baez’s luggage was indisputably a checked bag unac-
companied by its owner, a reasonable law enforcement officer would have wanted
to investigate.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
30 See id. at 276 (“[T]he TSA’s policy known as ‘when in doubt, report,’ . . .
would be defeated if air carriers and their employees were exposed to liability for
reporting a statement that references a bomb in luggage.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also id. at 275 (“‘[T]o accept [Baez’s] demand’ that an air-
line employee relay the ‘precise wording’ of a potential security threat ‘would
vitiate the purpose of ATSA immunity.’” (quoting Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 865)).
31 See 49 U.S.C. § 44905(a) (2012).
32 See Baez II, 793 F.3d at 276 (“[A] passenger who speculates aloud about
whether there is a bomb in her luggage cannot be heard to complain when an
airline representative reports the use of those words, even if the passenger’s pre-
cise words are misrepresented.”).
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Malabet’s report was materially false33—the reasoning whereby
the court arrived at its conclusion is, at best, questionable and
unsatisfying.
When the court asserted that “[a]ny reasonable security of-
ficer would follow up on a report of a disgruntled passenger
who adverted to a bomb in luggage and deprecated the agency
responsible for detecting such bombs,”34 it completely missed
the mark by converting the legal analysis from a specific inquiry
to one that is more general. The question is not, as the court
implied, whether a reasonable security officer would have inves-
tigated a reference to a bomb in luggage; the question is
whether the difference between what Baez actually said and
what Malabet allegedly reported could have caused a reasonable
security officer to perceive and respond to the report in a differ-
ent way.35 Furthermore, the breadth of the court’s categorical
assertion is problematic, for it implies that all references to
bombs in luggage made by passengers that appear “disgruntled”
should be treated equally.36 But context matters, and a reasona-
ble security officer very well could, and arguably should, react
differently to a visibly worried passenger, who perhaps is flying
for the first time, that voices aloud his hopes that there is noth-
ing dangerous in the luggage while doubting the efficacy of the
TSA, as opposed to a passenger who affirmatively states that she
has a bomb in her luggage.37
The reasoning employed in the court’s reference to the FBI
report is unconvincing because it glosses over the fact that the
FBI report did not merely contain Baez’s hypothetical formula-
tion “[w]hat if I had a bomb in my bag?” but also alleged that
Baez had affirmatively stated that “she did have a bomb in her
bag.”38 Thus, the FBI report does nothing to advance the court’s
notion that security officials would have investigated the matter
even if Malabet had reported Baez’s hypothetical question and
not, as Baez alleged, that she had made an affirmative assertion
about a bomb. Moreover, the report provides no evidence re-
33 See id. at 274.
34 See id. at 276.
35 See Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 863.
36 See Baez II, 793 F.3d at 276.
37 See 49 C.F.R. § 1542.307(a) (2015) (mandating that airport authorities cre-
ate procedures for evaluating bomb threats. Thus, a reasonable security officer’s
reaction to any given situation might differ depending on the procedures in
place at the airport in which he is working.).
38 Baez II, 793 F.3d at 273.
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garding the real issue in the case, which is whether the different
statements would have had a different effect on the mind of a
reasonable security official.
The court’s error in its application of the law is further evi-
denced by the court’s conclusion to the discussion of the issue
wherein the court stated that the TSA’s policy of ‘“when in
doubt, report’ would be defeated if air carriers and their em-
ployees were exposed to liability for reporting a statement that
references a bomb in luggage.”39 And so it would; but, once
again, the issue is not whether employees report such statements,
but how those statements are reported. Congress understood
and sought to protect the policy interest of encouraging airline
employees to liberally report suspicious statements.40 What Con-
gress did not condone, however, are instances in which an air-
line employee misrepresents a person’s statements in such a way
that would have a different effect on the mind of a reasonable
listener,41 which is exactly what Baez alleged Malabet did in this
case.42 For these reasons, the court erred in its application of the
law to the facts by discussing whether a reasonable security of-
ficer would have responded in general to Baez’s alleged hypo-
thetical remark rather than the true issue: whether the alleged
difference between the remark as uttered and the remark as re-
ported would have caused a reasonable security officer to per-
ceive and react to the remark differently.
Additionally, the assumptions and assertions contained in the
court’s opinion carry implications that could potentially result
in inefficient implementation of security measures as well as a
lack of accountability on the part of the employees that relay
information to authorities. In this case, the investigation and re-
sponse involved rerouting the plane and a subsequent bomb
search,43 and the inquiry is whether this response would have
been different had Malabet reported the incident differently.44
Thus, when the court asserted that an unaccompanied checked
suitcase on an airplane is enough to cause a reasonable officer
to investigate the matter,45 one could believe the court to be
suggesting that the authorities’ particular response in this case
39 See id. at 276.
40 See Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 857.
41 See id. at 863.
42 See Baez II, 793 F.3d at 272.
43 See id. at 273.
44 See id. at 274.
45 See id. at 275.
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was justified on the basis of the unaccompanied bag alone.
While the court is surely not suggesting that rerouting, landing,
and searching the plane is a reasonable response to every in-
stance in which a passenger accidently misses her plane, the
court should have clarified that, even assuming arguendo that a
reasonable officer would investigate every instance in which a
passenger missed her plane, a reasonable officer’s response to
such situations would depend on the circumstances of the
situation.
In another portion of the opinion, the court reasons that be-
cause an employee “may not confidently distinguish between a
veiled threat and a comment expressing genuine concerns
about security . . . once a report is made, it is for the TSA and
other law enforcement officers ‘to determine and execute a re-
sponse.’”46 This raises two issues. First, similar to the passage dis-
cussed in the preceding paragraph, this passage raises the issue
of efficiency as it relates to security policy. That it might be diffi-
cult at times to distinguish between a real threat and a non-
threat should not mean that an employee can simply notify the
authorities that a passenger mentioned, or made a “bare refer-
ence to,”47 a bomb, leaving security officials in the dark as to the
circumstances surrounding the report. If security personnel in-
vestigated every incident in which someone in an airport or an
airplane mentioned a bomb, terrorism, or violence, the result
would be unworkable inefficiency, not only for air travel, but
also for the security officers tasked with ensuring the safety of air
travel.48 Situational factors matter in determining which reports
merit an investigation.
Second, this passage raises questions regarding the allocation
of responsibility. Because circumstances matter, airline employ-
ees reporting questionable incidents should make a good faith
effort to accurately relay the circumstances surrounding the in-
cident so as to allow the recipient of the information to make
the best reasoned judgment regarding whether and how to re-
46 Id. (quoting Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 864).
47 Id.
48 Cf. Deponent: Kathleen Sweet, Barnes v. Carnival Corp, No. 1:06-CV-20784
(S.D. Fla. 2008), 2008 WL 8847851, in which an expert witness opined, regarding
security threats made on cruise ships, that “basic risk management principles say
that you evaluate the threat, then you take appropriate action. You don’t auto-
matically call in expensive US [sic] assets for no reason whatsoever. If that were
the case, we would stop shipping, we would stop commerce, we would stop every
cruise ship any time anybody ever may allegedly have said something.”
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spond. The court, by emphasizing the difficulty in deciphering
the significance of potential threats and the Supreme Court’s
dicta indicating that employees need not relay the “precise
wording” of a person’s statement,49 sent the message that airline
employees bear little responsibility for communicating accurate
information to authorities. However, airline employees are the
ones observing the incidents and should bear greater responsi-
bility in relaying accurate information. While the court was cor-
rect in stating that it is the security officers’ duty to “determine
and execute a response,”50 their decisions depend on the infor-
mation given to them by the airline employees. An employee’s
intentional or reckless alteration of the nature of a passenger’s
statement, combined with an omission of the circumstantial
facts, could drastically affect how a security official decides to
respond. Thus, the court by its language and tone sent the mes-
sage that the way in which an airline employee reports an inci-
dent does not matter and, in doing so, the court threatened not
only the efficacy of law enforcement in its effort to respond to
legitimate threats, but also the future and fortunes of those indi-
viduals who, while perhaps not speaking with due care, arguably
do not deserve the consequences that accompany a federal
investigation.
V. CONCLUSION
The circuit court’s opinion misapplied the law to the facts and
serves to advance a policy paradigm that is burdensome and
inefficient. Undoubtedly, society’s interest in air travel safety is
no less than compelling. Safety policy, however, must be reason-
able and not overreaching. Under the court’s ruling, airline em-
ployees in the Second Circuit can rest easy knowing that the
court is so willing to shield them from lawsuits arising out of
instances in which they inaccurately convey information to au-
thorities. On the other hand, if the general public is to take any-
thing away from the ruling, it is this: no matter how stressful the
situation, no matter how extenuating the circumstances, do not
ever, ever, utter the word “bomb” in an airport.
49 Baez II, 793 F.3d at 275 (quoting Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 865).
50 Id. (quoting Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 864).
